Keeping the Underclass In Its Place: Zoning, the Poor, and Residential Segregation by Papke, David Ray
Marquette University Law School
Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2009
Keeping the Underclass In Its Place: Zoning, the
Poor, and Residential Segregation
David Ray Papke
Marquette University Law School, david.papke@marquette.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
David Ray Papke, Keeping the Underclass In Its Place: Zoning, the Poor, and Residential
Segregation, 41 Urb. Law. 787 (2009). © 2009 American Bar Association. This information or any
portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or
stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the
American Bar Association.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Papke, David Ray, "Keeping the Underclass In Its Place: Zoning, the Poor, and Residential Segregation" (2009). Faculty Publications.
Paper 459.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/459
Keeping the Underclass
in Its Place: Zoning, the Poor,
and Residential Segregation
David Ray Papke*
IT HAS BECOME FASHIONABLE to argue that the preferences and choices
of Americans living in metropolitan areas are changing.1 Contemporary
middle and upper-class Americans, the argument goes, no longer want
to live in suburban subdivisions, work in office parks, and shop in en-
closed malls. One-third of all homeowners now express a preference for
living in compact urban settings or in older suburbs with an urban feel.2
The phrase "demographic inversion" has been used to suggest that the
well-to-do are blending into the center-city while the poor are joining
the middle and upper classes on the metropolitan outskirts.3
These descriptions of change in American metropolitan areas are
at best only partially true. "Gentrification," the process through which
older parts of the center-city are redeveloped for condominiums, restau-
rants, and stores appealing to the middle and upper classes, has surely
had an impact on many cities.4 However, while some degree of gentri-
fication has taken place in most downtown areas, the great majority of
middle and upper-class Americans continue to live on the outskirts of
the center-cities and even more so in the surrounding suburbs. In larger
metropolitan areas the fastest population growth has occurred in the
second and third rings of suburbs, in new communities that not long
*Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. A.B., Harvard College; J.D.,
Yale Law School; Ph.D. in American Studies, University of Michigan. The author
thanks Gordon Hylton, Alan Madry, Elise Papke, and Matt Parlow for critical readings
of earlier versions of this article and Joshua Pollack, Marquette University Law School
Class of 2010, for valuable research assistance.
1. See Alan Ehrenhalt, Trading Places-The Demographic Inversion of the Ameri-
can City, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 2008, at 19; Christopher B. Leinberger, The Next
Slum?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2008, at 70.
2. See Leinberger, supra note 1, at 74.
3. See Ehrenhalt, supra note 1, at 19.
4. Book-length studies of "gentrification" include LORETTA LEES, TOM SLATER &
ERWIN WYLY, GENTRIFICATION (2008); KATH NELSON ET AL., GENTRIFICATION AND
DISTRESSED CITIES: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS IN INTRAMETROPOLITAN MIGRATION
(1988). A useful collection of essays is GENTRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT, AND NEIGH-
BORHOOD REVITALIZATION (J. John Palin & Bruce London eds., 1984).
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ago were farmers' fields.' Even more strikingly, the poor and working
classes continue to live in the older, postindustrial center-cities.6 As a
result, contemporary American metropolitan areas remain overwhelm-
ingly segregated by socioeconomic class.7 Rich people can see other
rich people on the far side of their large suburban lots, and the poor live
snugly next door to the poor.
No socioeconomic class is more concentrated than the underclass.
Members of minority groups are disproportionately overrepresented in
the underclass, but race is not the defining characteristic of the under-
class. It consists of urban Americans with the weakest of ties to the
labor market. Indeed, many members of the underclass have divorced
themselves completely from legitimate employment. The underclass
lives almost exclusively in dilapidated rental housing in the most run-
down neighborhoods. The neighborhoods have high crime rates, with
members of the underclass being both the most common perpetrators
and victims.8 Serious problems such as drug addiction, prostitution, and
broken families are manifest, and the residential concentration of the
underclass appears to exacerbate the social pathology.
Why do members of the underclass remain in the center-city? After
all, Americans have in recent decades supposedly been relocating them-
selves at a rapid pace to places that they find culturally and socially
appealing. Technological advances and material abundance have alleg-
edly enabled Americans to choose their preferred neighborhoods and
communities.9 Unfortunately, members of the underclass do not have
such choices at their disposal. More specifically, middle and upper-
class suburbanites have used zoning laws to preclude the development
of inexpensive rental housing that members of the underclass might
afford, and the courts have been unreceptive to challenges to this zon-
ing. The bourgeois power structure, it seems, perceives no problem in
metropolitan residential segregation by class, and, indeed, the power
5. See JOSEPH A. RODRIGUEZ, CITY AGAINST SUBURB: THE CULTURE WARS IN AN
AMERICAN METROPOLIS 5 (1999).
6. See J. David Greenstone, Culture, Responsibility, and the Underclass, in THE
URBAN UNDERCLASS 405 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991); The Un-
derclass: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Government Printing
Office 33 (May 25, 1989) [hereinafter The Underclass] (testimony of Lawrence M.
Mead).
7. See generally, The Underclass, supra note 6.
8. See John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson, CRIME AND INEQUALITY 3 (1995). "The
victims of 'street crime' are overwhelmingly poor people, particularly blacks and Chi-
canos living in metropolitan areas." Tony Platt, Street Crime-A View from the Left,
9/10 CRIME & SOCIAL JUSTICE 26, 29 (1978).
9. See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT, 14, 302 (Houghton Mifflin 2008).
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structure may see distinct advantages in keeping the underclass literally
in its place.
In the article that follows, the first section scrutinizes and outlines
how suburban zoning ordinances keep the underclass out of the sub-
urbs. In the second section, I examine the difficulties a complainant
might encounter in challenging such zoning as unconstitutionally ex-
clusionary. In conclusion, I reiterate the reasons the suburbs might want
to keep the underclass out and also reflect on why the bourgeois power
structure in general would want the underclass to remain concentrated
in our center-cities. Overall, my goal in this article is not to critique
lines of legal reasoning or to propose law reforms but rather to capture
an oppressive aspect of American life and the role law plays in it.
I. Zoning Out the Underclass
Zoning caught on and won constitutional approval in the United States
in the years immediately following World War 1.10 New York City
claimed to have enacted the first comprehensive zoning ordinance, but
even more influential was a model zoning act distributed by Secretary
of Commerce Herbert Hoover in 1922 and 1923.11 By the end of 1923,
208 municipalities and 40 percent of the nation's urban population had
zoning.12 One reason for the remarkably rapid acceptance of zoning is
that it afforded an effective way to control not only use districts and
building sizes but also socioeconomic sectors of the population and
those sectors' residential options.13 When metropolitan areas burgeoned
in the middle decades of the twentieth century, the use of zoning to con-
trol socioeconomic sectors of the population grew even more important.
Particularly noteworthy for purposes of the article at hand are the suc-
cessful efforts to zone the underclass out of the suburbs.
One need look no further than the earliest important zoning decisions
for an awareness that zoning was about people as well as buildings. In
Miller v. Board of Public Works, 4 for example, the court considered a
Los Angeles emergency ordinance, adopted while formulating a more
comprehensive zoning ordinance, making it unlawful to construct or
alter buildings in certain districts so that the buildings could house more
10. See J.GORDON HYLTON, ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 130
(2d ed. 2003).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
14. Miller, 234 P. 381 (Cal. 1925).
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than two families.'5 George Miller sought a writ of mandamus compel-
ling the issuance of a building permit for a four-flat structure in the
regulated area. 16 In upholding the denial of Miller's writ, the court held
that Los Angeles' emergency ordinance was not a denial of constitu-
tional guarantees and also "that it is within the police power, by zon-
ing, to banish nuisances and 'near-nuisances' from certain districts."'7
More generally, the court thought that the creation of districts limited to
single-family homes and duplexes made sense. "[J]ustification for resi-
dential zoning may, in the last analysis, be rested upon the protection of
the civic and social values of the American home."' 8 "It is axiomatic,"
the court stated, "that the welfare, and [] the very existence, of a nation
depends upon the character and caliber of its citizenry. The character
and quality of manhood and womanhood are in a large measure the
result of the home environment."'' 9 Realizing, perhaps, that the linkage
of character to certain kinds of housing could be seen as impugning the
character of those who lived in other kinds of housing, the court added
a series of awkward qualifications that served only to underscore its
biases:
We do not wish to unduly emphasize the single family residence as a means of per-
petuating the home life of a people. There are many persons, who, by reason of cir-
cumstances, find apartment, flat, or hotel life necessary or preferable. Undoubtedly
many families do maintain ideal home life in apartments, flats, and hotels; and it is
also undoubtedly true that in many single family dwellings there is much of dissen-
sion and discord.2"
The 1926 case that resulted in the United States Supreme Court's ap-
proval of zoning, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,21 was based on
a zoning ordinance that separated single family residential use districts
from commercial and industrial use districts and also differentiated
among residential uses, separating into different districts single fam-
ily residential use from multi-family residential use.22 Ambler Realty
Company sought to invalidate Euclid, Ohio's zoning ordinance, which
precluded commercial and industrial development on large portions of
Ambler's land.23 The federal district court agreed that the ordinance, as
15. Id. at 382-83.
16. Id. at 384.
17. Id. at 384.
18. Id. at 386.
19. Miller, 234 P. at 387.
20. Id.
21. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
22. See Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
23. Id.
FALL 2009
ZONING, THE POOR, AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 791
applied to Ambler's property, was unconstitutional.2 4 "[I]t takes [the]
plaintiff's property, if not for private, at least for public use, without just
compensation," the court stated.25 In so doing, the ordinance "is in no
[ ] sense a reasonable or legitimate exercise of police power."26 While
Ambler had been concerned with its loss of commercial and industrial
development options, the court was more troubled by the way the ordi-
nance established different districts for single-family, two-family, and
apartment housing.27 The drafters of the ordinance wanted "to classify
the population and segregate them according to their income or situa-
tion in life.
28
The United States Supreme Court upheld the ordinance's separation
of housing type by district as within the ambit of the police powers, but,
like the district court, perceived connections among zoning, housing
type, and the people living in each type of housing. In his 6-3 opinion
for the Court, Justice Sutherland analogized zoning to nuisance law,
which was already well established, 29 and cast apartment buildings as a
type of quasi-nuisance comparable to certain businesses and industrial
uses; all of which could interfere with "the creation and maintenance
of residential districts... ."0 Sutherland then described at length how
apartment buildings can destroy a neighborhood, casting them as noth-
ing less than parasitical.3 '
Concerns about apartment buildings and apartment dwellers lived on,
and, more generally, the biases imbedded in zoning acquired a sharper
edge in the context of the accelerating suburbanization of the post-
24. Id. at 317.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Ambler Realty, 297 F at 309.
28. Id. at 316.
29. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
30. Id. at 390.
31. With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the develop-
ment of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses,
which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private house purposes;
that in such sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in
order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the
residential character of the district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is
followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of
air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller
homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident
to increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of moving and parked
automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and de-
priving children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in
more favored localities-until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and
its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly destroyed. Id. at 394.
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World War II decades." Suburbs existed prior to then, but during the
first half of the twentieth century Americans in general saw the cities
and their suburbs as complementary.33 In the post-World War II decades,
by contrast, many Americans came to see cities and their suburbs as an-
tagonistic. By the 1960s, some even "concluded that cities and suburbs
represented completely different, and conflicting, cultural values."34
It became increasingly common to speak of "an 'urban culture' and a
'suburban culture' as representing distinct outlooks and ways of life."35
The intensity of what became the suburbanites' attitudes regarding
the central city should not be underestimated. Some suburbanites per-
ceive the needs of the central city-better schools, extended social sup-
port programs, and enhanced law enforcement-as terribly expensive
and do not want to tax themselves in order to address them. On a deeper
level, many suburbanites, especially those in the so-called "edge cities"
that constitute the outer ring of suburbs, see themselves as "normal,
decent, and under siege. '36 These suburbanites construct their identi-
ties at least in part with reference to their communities' houses, streets,
parks, and undeveloped land, and this "seemingly innocent appreciation
of landscapes and desire to protect local history and nature can act as
subtle but highly effective mechanisms of exclusion and reaffirmation
of class identity."37 Furthermore, the construction of identity is aided
immensely if there is a "constitutive outside."38 The scholar Gerald Frug
even argues that suburbs require central cities as a constituent part of
their identity.39 "In the resulting, socially polarized metropolitan land-
scape, representations of cities as 'landscapes of fear' and their resi-
dents as inherently threatening flourished."'
Zoning is the major legal process used by contemporary American
suburbs to keep the underclass, the rental housing in which it lives, and
32. The voluminous literature on changes in suburbanization includes ROBERT FISH-
MAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA (1987); JOEL GARREAU,
EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1991); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); PETER 0. MULLER,
CONTEMPORARY SUBURBAN AMERICA (1981).
33. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 5, at 10.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. STEVE MACEK, URBAN NIGHTMARES: THE MEDIA, THE RIGHT, AND THE MORAL
PANIC OVER THE CITY 71 (2006).
37. JAMES S. DUNCAN & NANCY G. DUNCAN, LANDSCAPES OF PRIVILEGE: THE POL-
ITICS OF THE AESTHETIC IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 4 (Routledge 2004).
38. See id. at 3.
39. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 77 (Princeton Univ. Press 1999).
40. MACEK, supra note 36, at xvii.
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"the city" itself out. While in an earlier era, race might have been used
as a surrogate for class, the United States Supreme Court long ago ruled
that zoning couched with reference to race was "in direct violation of
the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment."'" Today,
class rather than race is the primary basis of exclusionary zoning, and
although they may not speak of the "underclass" per se, suburban plan-
ners and zoning boards target the underclass for exclusion more so than
any other socioeconomic group.
Perhaps needless to add, zoning ordinances do not mention the un-
derclass or the poor in the zoning ordinances themselves. Instead, zon-
ing ordinances use designations related to building locations, types, and
sizes to indirectly address who might be able to live in certain areas or
municipalities. This approach is both more politically copasetic and less
susceptible to legal challenge, but the approach is hardly secret or clan-
destine. The major techniques of exclusionary zoning include zoning
for non-residential uses only, or, in residential areas, using minimum
lot size, minimum square footage, etc., which result in large, expensive
homes being the only feasible development option.42
Overall, the techniques work in two ways. First, they might be em-
ployed to prompt development other than the type of inexpensive rental
housing in which the underclass might live. Second, and sometimes in
tandem, the techniques might be used to simply prevent the develop-
ment of inexpensive rental housing. Regardless of the technique cho-
sen, members of the underclass are rarely in a position to purchase even
the smallest of single-family homes; rental housing is necessary if the
urban poor are to call a suburb home.
If a suburb chooses techniques designed to prevent all residential de-
velopment, problems might ensue. For starters, courts might invalidate
the zoning.43 Also the zones could fail to attract industrial or commercial
development and remain empty, prompting complaints about harm to the
tax base. If the zones did attract industry, meanwhile, the residents of the
suburb might be unhappy with its presence or with workers who obtained
jobs in the new plants. "Community" in outlying suburbs, after all, is a
fragile matter, relying as much on appealing images and optimistic pro-
41. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
42. See PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 22-17 TO § 22-30
(5th ed. 2008); PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULA-
TION 379-82 (2d ed. 2003); see also Gerald Frug, The Legal Technology of Exclusion
in Metropolitan America, in THE NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY 205-19 (Kevin M. Kruse &
Thomas J. Sugrue eds., 2006).
43. See SALKIN, supra note 42, at § 22-17.
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jections as on genuine interactions and social relations. In some suburbs
"community" has to a large extent "been reduced to NIMBYism and the
collective consumption of a romanticized landscape of community."44
A more common approach for suburban zoning authorities involves
large-lot and wide-lot-frontage requirements, rendering the develop-
ment of large, expensive homes as the only feasible option. More will be
said in the next section of this article about the federal courts' reactions
to exclusionary zoning, but for now it can be noted that as early as 1974
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made clear
that exclusive large-lot zoning would not be vulnerable to challenges
mounted by the poor.45 Two individuals and the Confederacion de la
Raza Unida challenged the zoning ordinance of Los Altos, California,
which provided that all housing lots in Los Altos consist of not less than
one acre and contain no more than one primary structure. This approach
to zoning kept out the poor and reinforced the exclusivity of the com-
munity.' The court found the zoning ordinance constitutional because
it was "rationally related to preserving the town's rural environment." 47
Low-cost housing was available in other parts of the county, and the
court stated that while California law did require a town to have housing
for its residents, the law "does not require it to provide housing for non-
residents, even though the non-residents may live in the broader urban
community of which the town is a part."48
State courts have rejected challenges to large-lot zoning requiring
even larger minimum lot sizes, assuming the challenged town or munic-
ipality can show the large-lot zoning was not purely arbitrary and unrea-
sonable.49 In a controversial Massachusetts case, for example, plaintiffs
challenged a zoning ordinance that required all lots in about one-half of
Edgartown to be at least three acres in size.50 The zoning seemed clearly
designed to fortify the socioeconomic exclusiveness of Martha's Vine-
yard. Suggesting the zoning would help protect the swampy Edgartown
Great Pond, the appellate court held that the three-acre requirement was
44. DUNCAN & DUNCAN, supra note 37, at 5.
45. See Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
46. Indeed, the Court itself bluntly noted "no poor people live or work in Los Altos."
Id. at 254.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Countrywalk Condominiums, Inc. v. City of Orchard Lake Vill., 561
N.W.2d 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Johnson v. Town of Edgartown, 680 N.E.2d 37(Mass. 1977); Ketchell v. Bainbridge Twp., 557 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio 1990); Kirk v. Zon-
ing Bd. of Honey Brook Twp., 713 A.2d 1226 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
50. See Town of Edgartown, 680 N.E.2d at 37.
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acceptable. 1 Indeed, it seems that the more exclusive a suburb aspires
to be, the larger its lots will be. In the town of Bedford, New York, for
example, eighty percent of the land has a four-acre minimum, and some
communities in Main County, just across the Bay from San Francisco,
have five-acre zoning.5 2
If a suburb is less affluent or lacks undeveloped land for large-lot
zoning, it might attempt to simply preclude the types of inexpensive
rental housing in which the underclass might live such as multiple-
family row houses and town houses, apartment buildings, and mobile
homes. "Where apartments are permitted, some ordinances encourage
luxury apartments by requiring specified land area for each family unit,
and effectively exclude families by restricting the number of apartments
which can be constructed with more than one bedroom."53 A body of
case law has emerged in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey that
impedes or at least challenges the most blatant exclusionary zoning of
this sort,54 but its impact is limited. "Unfortunately, because of the ex-
traordinary difficulty of fashioning a remedy that would be politically
acceptable and yet effective in responding to the needs of the excluded
groups, little in the way of tangible change has taken place as a result
of these cases. '55
The hostility of the suburbs to mobile homes and the people who live
in them is especially revealing.56 Even though the mobile home is "one
of the few available forms of nonsubsidized affordable housing,'' 57 no
other type of housing in America has been "more broadly vilified. '58
Why might that be? One could honestly complain that mobile homes
51. See id. at 41-42.
52. See DUNCAN & DUNCAN, supra note 37, at 87.
53. SALKIN, supra note 42, at 22-25.
54. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975); Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Vill. of Upper Brookville, 414 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y.
1980); In re Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 461 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1983).
55. SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 42, at 378.
56. Mobile homes to some extent evolved from the trailer homes that first came to
the public's attention in 1935. DAVID A. THORNBURG, GALLOPING BUNGALOWS: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF THE AMERICAN HOUSE TRAILER 1 (1991). Trailers grew in popu-
larity during World War II and the late 1940s, but in the 1950s trailers started to grow
larger, boxier, and flimsier. Id. at 174. What's more, the owners of this new breed of
trailers were increasingly likely to stay put. The very wheels on their trailers shrunk and
then disappeared completely. "The public at large continued to call these monsters trail-
ers, much to the chagrin of builder and buyer alike. But they weren't trailers and hadn't
really been trailers since they crossed the thirty-three-foot line." Id. at 174.
57. ALLAN D. WALLIS, WHEEL ESTATE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF MOBILE HOMES
199 (1997).
58. Id. at v.
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themselves are mass produced, standardized, and not particularly ap-
pealing to the eye. Those hostile to mobile homes could also argue that
mobile homes deteriorate rapidly and that they are especially vulner-
able to tornadoes, hurricanes and other storms. Indeed, mobile homes
depreciate in value over time more like cars and trucks than single-
family homes. That depreciation could conceivably wreak havoc with a
suburban tax base.
In reality, though, excluding mobile homes from one's suburb relates
less to the type of housing than to the type of people thought most likely
to occupy that housing. Almost as soon as the mobile home market
shifted in the 1950s to a less affluent and less educated population, mo-
bile homes came to be seen by the middle and upper classes as decid-
edly d6class6,i 9 As early as the 1950s residents of mobile home parks
came to be seen as "trailer trash," and mobile homes parks concomi-
tantly struck some "as a new kind of slum."6 The negative bourgeois
attitude regarding the presumably lower-class residents of the mobile
home parks remained dominant in subsequent decades and even sur-
faced in comments by influential members of the national executive
branch. In 1996, Paula Jones alleged President Bill Clinton had sexually
harassed her while he was Governor of Arkansas. When inner-circle
Clinton adviser James Carville responded to the allegations by Jones,
he attempted to discredit Jones by playing on widespread bias against
those who live in mobile homes. "Drag $100 bills through trailer parks,"
Carville said, "and there's no telling what you'll find."61 Everyone ap-
preciated that the comment was an insult to Jones; some realized it was
also offensive to everyone living in mobile home parks.
Case law varies as to whether a municipality can completely preclude
mobile homes,62 but the "majority view supports the conclusion that a
prohibition of trailer and mobile home parks from undeveloped areas is
unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore a violation of due process. '63
Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that suburbs can restrict mobile
homes and mobile home parks to designated areas and also prescribe
conditions for their establishment and design.' 4 Sometimes the desig-
nated areas for mobile home parks do not really exist. One Pennsylvania
town, for example, restricted mobile home parks to commercial areas,
59. See id. at 188.
60. Id. at 173.
61. Adam Cohen, Will She Have Her Day in Court, TIME, Jan. 20, 1997, at 32.
62. See AL SHEPARD, MOBILE HOMES AND MOBILE HOME PARKS 274-76 (1975).
63. Id. at 275.
64. See id.
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knowing in advance that no land for future parks was available in those
areas. A court declined to find this approach arbitrary or unreasonable.65
The courts have also upheld an ordinance that generally excluded mo-
bile home parks, but permitted them in planned development districts
with special application procedures.' Then, too, stringent guidelines
and regulations on mobile homes themselves can effectively keep them
out of town. 67 One survey found that mobile home placements were
most likely to be restricted in communities that were wealthy, spent
heavily on their schools, and were growing rapidly.68 Outlying suburbs
are perfect examples of communities with these characteristics.
Excluding mobile homes from the suburbs in hopes of keeping out
poor people is only one illustration of how zoning is about not only
land uses and buildings but also people. Zoning can be "a short-hand
for unstated rules regarding what are widely regarded as correct social
categories and relationships, that is, not only how land uses should be
arranged but how land users, as a social category, are to be related to
one another."69 Like apartment dwellers in the 1920s, members of the
contemporary underclass are held in low esteem. They are unwelcome
in middle and upper-class communities, and zoning boards, planning
commissions, and local officials have successfully zoned the underclass
out of the suburbs.
H. Constitutional Challenges to Exclusionary Zoning
If one hoped to stop exclusionary zoning by suburban governments, one
might turn to federal constitutional law. While some state courts have
attempted to limit exclusionary practices by state law, 7° federal con-
stitutional law, especially the Fourteenth Amendment, on the surface
offers greater promise. Local governments are political subdivisions
of the state, and zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to state enabling
statutes constitute state action.7 The federal guarantees of due process
65. See Appeal of Groff, 274 A.2d 574 (Pa. 1971).
66. See Viii. Bd. of Tr. of Malone v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vill. of Malone, 164
A.D.2d 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
67. See JOHN FRASER HART, MICHELLE J. RHODES, & JOHN T. MORGAN, THE UN-
KNOWN WORLD OF THE MOBILE HOME 22-23 (2002) (zoning authorities might employ
such requirements as minimum height/length ratios, minimum floor areas, foundation
requirements, exterior siding quality, window sizes, and even roof pitch and style).
68. See WALLIS, supra note 57, at 179.
69. CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE
IN AMERICA 4 (1979).
70. See cases cited supra note 54.
71. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
519-20 (3d ed. 2000).
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and equal protection could, therefore, plausibly apply. But alas, despite
all of these premises holding firm, federal constitutional law has done
almost nothing to alleviate the problem of zoning that excludes the un-
derclass. In a string of important decisions from the 1970s, the United
States Supreme Court closed the door to effective challenges by the
underclass to suburban zoning, and this door has never been reopened.
The preclusion of challenges begins with the issue of who might sue
an exclusionary local government. In particular, do those excluded have
standing to sue? Article III of the United States Constitution, which
both establishes and limits the courts' authority states, "The judicial
power shall extend to ... cases [and] ... controversies."72 The federal
courts have taken this language to prevent the consideration of general-
ized grievances, as genuine and pressing as they might be.
The most important opinion regarding standing to challenge exclu-
sionary zoning is Warth v. Seldin.73 The plaintiffs in the case included
various individuals residing in Rochester, New York; a trade association
engaged in the construction of housing in the Rochester area; and a co-
alition of community groups trying to increase low and middle-income
housing options.74 The plaintiffs, troubled by what they perceived as
exclusionary zoning in the town of Penfield, a suburb of Rochester,
brought suit against Penfield and its zoning, planning, and town boards.
Plaintiffs claimed Penfield's zoning ordinance allocated 98% of the
town's vacant land to single-family, detached housing and employed
lot size, setback, floor area, and habitable space requirements to pre-
clude any housing low and moderate-income people might afford.75 The
plaintiffs also claimed Penfield:
had delayed action on proposals for low- and moderate-cost housing for inordinate
periods of time; denied such proposals for arbitrary and insubstantial reasons; re-
fused to grant necessary variances and permits, or to allow tax abatements; failed to
provide necessary support services for low- and moderate-cost housing projects; and
had amended the ordinance to make approval of such projects virtually impossible.76
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Powell acknowledged a court's
responsibility, when considering a motion to dismiss for lack of stand-
ing, to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and also
to construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.77 Hence, he
72. U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 2.
73. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
74. Id. at 490.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 495-96.
77. See id. at 501.
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assumed "that Penfield's zoning ordinance and the pattern of enforce-
ment by respondent officials have had the purpose and effect of exclud-
ing persons of low and moderate income.""s He also assumed "that such
intentional exclusionary practices, if proved in a proper case, would
be adjudged violative of the constitutional and statutory rights of the
persons excluded."79
Nevertheless, regarding the claims of the individual plaintiffs from
Rochester, the Court held "[n]one of these petitioners has a present
interest in any Penfield property; none is himself subject to the ordi-
nance's structures;[sic] and none has even been denied a variance or
permit by respondent officials.""s In short, they had no particularized
injury caused by Penfield's zoning ordinance or actions thereunder.
"Indeed," the Court stated, "petitioners' descriptions of their individual
financial situations and housing needs suggest precisely the contrary-
that their inability to reside in Penfield is the consequence of the eco-
nomics of the area housing market, rather than of [Penfield's] assertedly
illegal acts."'" "We hold," the Court concluded, "only that a plaintiff
who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege spe-
cific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm
him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the
court's intervention. 82
The Court's pronouncements on standing prompted pointed dissents
from its liberal wing. In a dissent joined by Justices White and Mar-
shall, Justice Brennan asserted, "[T]he portrait which emerges from the
allegations and affidavits is one of total, purposeful, intransigent exclu-
sion of certain classes of people from the town."83 In Brennan's view,
at least three of the groups of plaintiffs had made allegations and pro-
vided enough evidence to have standing.84 In a separate dissent, Justice
Douglas said the petitioners' complaint that Penfield had used zoning
"to foist an un-American community model on the people of this area"85
78. Warth, 422 U.S. at 502.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 506.
82. Id. at 507. The Court's opinion also went on to dismiss claims of other plaintiffs,
leading one commentator to speculate that the decision reflected "a general disincli-
nation on the part of the federal courts to become involved in exclusionary zoning-
lawsuits." DAVID H. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 28 (Ballinger,
1977).
83. Warth, 422 U.S. at 523.
84. See id. at 521.
85. Id. at 519.
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had been read by the court "with antagonistic eyes."86 Douglas paused
to reflect on the way people like to keep those they dislike out of their
homes and communities:
A clean, safe, and well-heated home is not enough for some people. Some want to
live where the neighbors are congenial and have social and political outlooks similar
to their own. This problem of sharing areas of the community is akin to that when one
wants to control the kind of persons who shares his own abode. 7
Cases like Warth, he thought, "reflect festering sores in our society.""a
There might in fact be members of the underclass who could dem-
onstrate the type of particularized injury necessary to achieve standing
under the Court's analysis. One who signed an anticipatory lease for a
unit in a low-cost apartment complex that a developer had in mind for
a specific suburban site may have standing. Alternatively, and perhaps
more likely, members of the underclass could be referenced by a de-
veloper. Because of available tax credits and their perception of market
opportunities, some developers are ready and able to develop low-cost
suburban housing. If a developer encountered difficulty because of ex-
clusionary zoning, the developer could sue the suburb and in the pro-
cess argue on behalf of the members of the underclass who might not
have been able to achieve standing on their own. Precedent dating back
at least to the 1920s exists for the proposition that parties can argue on
behalf of others if, for one reason or another, the latter are unable to
achieve standing on their own.89
To be sure, arguments of this sort do not automatically prevail, and in
2004 the Supreme Court held that a group of Michigan attorneys could
not assert the rights of indigent defendants denied appellate counsel.90
The Court, however, acknowledged that a third party could assert the
rights of another if (1) the party had a close relationship with the party
who possesses the rights and (2) something hinders the possessor of the
rights from protecting his or her interests. 9' It would be at least argu-
ably true that a developer's relationship with a future tenant was suffi-
ciently "close" and also that the practical difficulties faced by members
of the underclass in finding low-rent housing in a suburb might consti-
86. Id. at 518.
87. Id.
88. Warth, 422 U.S. at 519.
89. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
90. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004).
91. Id. at 129. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg cast these requirements as
"prudential considerations" that are important for a court to bear in mind. Id. at 137.
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tute a severe hindrance. After all, the center-city poor are ill-equipped
to know of particular housing possibilities in particular suburbs. Fur-
thermore, members of the underclass are not privy to either developers'
various plans or to a suburb's political rhythms and concerns.
Even assuming that an underclass plaintiff can demonstrate particu-
larized injury or that a sympathetic developer invokes the interests of
underclass citizens in a lawsuit against an exclusionary suburb, they
are unlikely to prevail on the merits. In order to subject the exclusion-
ary zoning to some degree of heightened scrutiny, the plaintiffs would
have to (1) demonstrate their fundamental rights had been violated or
(2) show they had been denied the equal protection of laws as members
of a suspect class.9 2
As for the first possibility, the courts have found government ac-
tion to violate fundamental rights of the poor,93 but the courts have not
taken housing to be one of those rights. The most important decision in
the area is Lindsey v. Normet,94 which grew out of tenants' complaints
about the sorry state of their rented housing in Portland, Oregon. While
the Supreme Court did find the state wrongful detainer statute's double-
bond requirement for tenant appeals of an adverse decision to be an
arbitrary and irrational violation of the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment,95 the Court rejected any federal constitutional right to ad-
equate housing. The Court said:
We are unable to perceive in [the United States Constitution] any constitutional guar-
antee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any recognition of the right
of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease
without payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement.
Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition
of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions. Nor should we
forget that the Constitution expressly protects against confiscation of private property
or the income therefrom.
96
In short, there was no recognizable fundamental right to housing in
the United States. Perhaps sounding more irritated than he intended,
92. See San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973);
Harold E. Spaeth, Strict Scrutiny, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 845 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
93. The Supreme Court has strictly scrutinized limitations on the rights of the poor
with regard to voting and with regard to criminal trial and appellate processes. See Bull-
ock v. Carter, 404 U.S. 134 (1972); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
94. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
95. See id. at 79.
96. Id. at 74.
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Justice White's opinion reminded us that "the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill."97
With regard to an equal protection claim, the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution guarantees that no state shall "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."98
One might think that suburban zoning ordinances designed to keep out
the underclass would surely deny the underclass equal protection of the
laws, but a major problem lurks. To wit, the Court has made clear since
at least the 1970s that class distinctions are not a basis for equal protec-
tion claims. More specifically, poverty is not a suspect condition of the
sort that would subject suburban zoning to heightened scrutiny.9
In James v. Valtierra,1°° the Court considered claims arising from the
adoption by California voters of Article XXXIV of the state constitu-
tion, providing that "no low-rent housing project should be developed,
constructed, or acquired in any manner by a state public body until the
project was approved by a majority of those voting at a community
election."'' Local governments qualified as "state public bodies," and
a "low-rent housing project" was taken to be dwellings, apartments, or
other living accommodations for the poor.0 2 California defined "per-
sons of low income" to be "persons or families who lack the amount
of income which is necessary (as determined by the state public body
developing, constructing, or acquiring the housing project) to enable
them without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and sanitary
dwellings, without overcrowding.""0 3
Given the requirements created by Article XXXIV, it was hardly
surprising that various California communities held referenda regard-
ing proposals for low-income housing and that the voters rejected those
projects."° Citizens in the City of San Jose and also in San Mateo
County sued, alleging, among other things, that the California law de-
nied the poor equal protection of the laws by restricting the development
of housing they could afford.'05 A three-judge district panel agreed with
the plaintiffs, 1° but the United States Supreme Court reversed.0 7
97. Id.
98. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
99. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 139 (discussing CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1 (1950)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 139.
105. See id.
106. See James v. Valtierra, 313 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1970).
107. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137.
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In his opinion for the Court in Valtierra, Justice Black carefully ac-
knowledged an earlier decision in which the relevant state law referred
to race,108 but he underscored that the California referendum require-
ment did not apply only to low-rent housing that would necessarily be
occupied by members of a racial minority group. 109 He also observed
that the actual record "would not support any claim that a law seem-
ingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority.""' Ob-
viously, Article XXXIV placed a special burden on those seeking to
develop low-rent housing and, by extension, on poor people who might
live in such housing, but Justice Black insisted, "a lawmaking proce-
dure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal
protection"I"
As was the case with the other crucial decisions precluding or reject-
ing underclass challenges to exclusionary zoning, the Supreme Court's
liberal wing filed a vigorous dissent. Justice Marshall, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun, thought Article XXXIV clearly singled
out low-income persons and "on its face constitutes invidious discrimi-
nation which the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment plainly prohibits."112 Justice Marshall made clear that he did not
think the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
were limited to race. "It is far too late in the day to contend that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial discrimination; and, to
me, singling out the poor to bear a burden not placed on any other class
of citizens tramples the values that the Fourteenth Amendment was de-
signed to protect."' 13
Without the argument that housing is their fundamental right or that
they have been denied equal protection of the laws, members of the un-
derclass find themselves in an unpropitious position. They would have
to show suburban zoning is arbitrary or capricious, but as the discus-
sion in this article's previous section suggests, courts have traditionally
taken different zoning classifications for different plots to be reason-
able. 4 A strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to zoning
ordinances. 5
108. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 396-97 (1969) (where the relevant state
law was Ohio law).
109. See Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 142.
112. Id. at 144.
113. Id. at 145.
114. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
115. Id.
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Overall, then, the underclass has little reason to hope exclusionary
zoning could be successfully challenged. "[Olne should not be optimis-
tic of the chances for success in the federal courts in a case challeng-
ing exclusionary zoning because it is economically discriminatory."' 6
Suburban zoning in American metropolitan areas effectively prevents
the underclass from living in the suburbs and thereby confines the
underclass to the center-city. When this zoning has been challenged
as exclusionary, the courts have for the most part denied standing for
the plaintiffs or refused to accept their constitutional arguments. Law
creates areas in which the poor cannot live and refuses to correct its
handiwork.
III. Conclusion
Any discussion of patterns in a large socio-legal phenomenon should
acknowledge exceptions and counter-examples, and surely this is true
in a discussion of exclusionary zoning and the underclass. Suburbs exist
in which members of the underclass have been able to find low-cost
rental housing."7 These suburbs are likely to be older communities
and to be located immediately adjacent to a center-city, but members
of the underclass can and do call them home. Then, too, some appel-
late courts, most notably those in New Jersey, have ruled that cities and
towns must plan for a variety of housing including inexpensive rental
housing and take on their regional fair share of the latter.' I Most gen-
erally, no shortage of commentators have been appalled by the current
state of affairs and have suggested how "inclusionary" as opposed to
exclusionary zoning might work. 19
But exceptions, counter-examples, and pleas for reform notwithstand-
ing, the overall pattern involving zoning and the underclass remains
clear. Middle and upper-class Americans do not want the underclass
nearby, and outlying suburbs in particular have used zoning ordinances
116. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 82, at 109.
117. One example is Harvey, Illinois, a suburb to the south of Chicago. An older,
industrial town, Harvey became predominantly poor and African American in the late
1960s and early 1970s. See Earl Ray Hutchison, Jr., Black Suburbanization: A History
of Social Change in a Working Class Suburb (1984) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago) (on file at Raynor Memorial Library, Marquette University).
118. For an intriguing commentary on New Jersey's Mount Laurel decision by
its author, see Frederick W. Hall, A Review of the Mount Laurel Decision, in AFTER
MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEW SUBURBAN ZONING 39, 45 (Jerome G. Rose & Robert E.
Rothman eds., 1977).
119. See Brian R. Lerman, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning-The Answer to the
Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383 (2006); DOUGLAS R.
PORTER, INCLUSIONARY ZONING FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2004).
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to make it difficult if not impossible for members of the underclass to
relocate to those suburbs. The federal courts, in turn, have been unre-
ceptive to constitutional challenges to this variety of exclusionary zon-
ing. As a result, members of the underclass stay put, dealing with urban
blight and encountering difficulty finding, getting to, or even caring
about jobs.
The reasons suburbanites do not want members of the underclass in
their communities vary. For some, the chief reason is fiscal. Housing the
poor, some are sure, would mean higher taxes to support more schools,
law enforcement personnel, and social-welfare programs. 20 For others,
the chief reason is fear of the underclass and of what the urban poverty
connotes: dysfunctional families, crime, drug use, and "the city" in gen-
eral. Middle and upper-class suburbanites are afraid the underclass will
transport these aspects of social life into their communities.
Sometimes these fears seem racist, and, indeed, class biases in the
United States are often coded with racial references. In reality, though,
the issue is not one of race. Professionals and business executives who
belong to minority groups can and do purchase appealing single-family
homes and luxury condominiums in the suburbs. The urban poor, by
contrast, are unable to find low-cost rental housing in the suburbs re-
gardless of their race.
In addition to keeping the underclass out of the suburbs, might the
power structure have reasons to keep the underclass in the center-
city? The goals here would be less consciously intentional and more
a matter of operational usefulness. Legislative studies would not call
for them, and politicians would not base campaigns on them. Master
plans would not address them directly. Nevertheless, keeping the un-
derclass in center-city neighborhoods and ensuring the existence of
such neighborhoods does have some usefulness for middle and upper-
class suburbanites.
Two examples involve locating vice activities and assorted reha-
bilitative homes. Underclass neighborhoods can serve as marketplaces
for prostitution and illegal drugs, that is, for services and goods some
members of the middle and upper classes might want to purchase but
not in their own neighborhoods and communities. Also, underclass
neighborhoods can "be used for facilities other neighborhoods reject,
from homeless shelters and halfway houses for AIDS patients and re-
120. See Jerome G. Rose, The Courts and the Balanced Community, in AFTER
MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEW SUBURBAN ZONING 15 (Jerome G. Rose & Robert E. Roth-
man eds., 1977).
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habilitated drug abusers to toxic and other dumps. ' 121 All metropolitan
areas need "stigmatized areas" of this sort to operate, 122 but the con-
centration and further development of such facilities "help ensure that
underclass communities are perceived as dysfunctional and dangerous
communities."1
23
The most important functional ramification of keeping the underclass
in center-city neighborhoods is containment. Because the underclass
for the most part lacks rewarding and sustained employment, bourgeois
interests do not exploit the underclass in the way they exploited the tra-
ditional agricultural and industrial working class. Individual members
of the underclass continue to own their own "units" of labor power, but
the labor power ceases to have exploitable value in advanced capitalism
if it is not deployed. 124 As a result, the underclass is virtually expend-
able in the reigning socioeconomic system, and some might wish the
underclass would somehow disappear. That is impossible, and in fact
the underclass is growing and becoming more visible as its residential
segregation increases. "The alternative, then, is to build prisons and to
cordon off the zones in cities in which the underclass lives."'125 This has
the effect, at least, of containing what is perceived as a problem.
In the end, this containment constitutes a variety of oppression. Seg-
regated in deteriorating center-cities, the underclass copes with not only
its impoverishment but also weaker family structures, poorer health, and
more exposure to crime and violence. Most generally, the underclass
has less opportunity, fulfillment, and happiness than the middle and
upper classes. Zoning and the bourgeois legal system in general play
major roles in creating and perpetuating the contemporary American
underclass. There seems little likelihood of change in the near future.
121. HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND AN-
TIPOVERTY POLICY 37, 99 (1995).
122. Id.
123. JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
THE UNDERCLASS 1890-1990 260 (1993).
124. See Erik Olin Wright, "Class Analysis," in SOCIAL CLASS AND STRATIFICA-
TION: CLASSIC STATEMENTS AND THEORETICAL DEBATE 143, 154 (Rhonda F. Levine
ed., 1998).
125. Id. at 155.
FALL 2009
